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Abstract 
We investigate why spreads on corporate bonds are so much larger than expected losses from default.  Systematic 
factors make very little contribution to spreads, even if higher moments or downside effects are taken into account.  
Instead we find that sizes of spreads are strongly related to idiosyncratic-risk factors: not only to idiosyncratic equity 
volatility, but even more to idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk.  Idiosyncratic bond 
volatility helps to explain spreads because it reflects not just the distribution of firm value but is also a proxy for 
liquidity risk.  Idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk adds to this by capturing the left-skewness of the firm-value 
distribution.  We confirm our results both for the initial 1997-2004 sample period and also out of sample for 2005-
2009, which includes the sub-prime crisis.  Overall, credit spreads are large because they incorporate a large risk 
premium related to investors’ fears of extreme losses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many researchers have noted that spreads on corporate bonds are extremely large relative to their 
apparent risks.  Spreads are larger than can be justified by expected losses from default (e.g., 
Elton et al., 2001) and larger than those generated by most option-based models which depend 
on the distribution of firm value (e.g., Eom, Helwege and Huang, 2004; Huang and Huang, 
2003).  This has become known as “the credit spread puzzle.”  It is particularly severe for bonds 
which have high ratings and short times to maturity.   
 
The aim of our paper is to assess the extent to which measures of risk, derived from past equity 
and bond returns, can generate the credit spreads which are observed today.  We use a sample of 
investment-grade corporate bonds observed weekly over 1998 to 2004 to answer this question 
and then confirm our results with an additional sample over 2005 to 2009, which includes the 
sub-prime crisis.  Our focus is on explaining the sizes of spreads rather than just explaining their 
variances over time.  In other words, we are more interested in economic relevance than in 
statistical significance, since in a sample as large as ours almost any variable is statistically 
significant but rather few are of economic importance.   
 
We begin by examining the contribution of systematic risk and our first approach is the 
conventional one, which relates bond spreads to the three Fama/French systematic factors.  Elton 
et al. (2001) suggest that these systematic risks – equity-market covariance, SMB and HML – 
may be important for bond spreads.  These risks do explain some of the cross-sectional variance 
in our study, but their economic importance is minimal: together they generate just a few basis 
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points of the median spread (of 111 basis points).  Most studies to date have assumed that risk 
factors have a symmetric influence, but a few researchers have also suggested that spreads reflect 
the asymmetric returns which come from undiversifiable skewness in bond portfolios (Amato 
and Remolona, 2003, 2005).  We therefore test whether higher moments – systematic co-
skewness risk (Harvey and Siddique, 2000) or systematic downside covariance risk (Ang, Chen 
and Xing, 2006) – can explain observed spreads.  Again we find that the effects are much too 
small to explain observed spreads.  Consequently, we reach the conclusion that systematic risk 
factors, even with a downside focus, are weak candidates for directly explaining credit spreads.   
 
Having dismissed systematic factors, we turn to the role of idiosyncratic factors in bond spreads.  
The theory of contingent claims (Merton, 1974) values a corporate bond as a risk-free bond less 
a deep-out-of-the-money put option on firm value.  Based on this intuition, Campbell and 
Taksler (2003) show that idiosyncratic equity volatility (as a proxy for the volatility of firm 
value) has an important role in determining spreads.  Extending this analysis, we examine two 
additional idiosyncratic bond return-based risk measures, namely idiosyncratic bond volatility 
and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk.  We find that both these risk measures contain additional 
information (beyond that in idiosyncratic equity volatility) that is relevant for determining credit 
spreads, and that  idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk makes a larger economic contribution to 
spreads than does idiosyncratic bond volatility.  Combining idiosyncratic value at risk with S&P 
volatility, we can explain up to 99 basis points (89%) of the median spread. 
 
These results raise two questions.  First, why does idiosyncratic bond volatility contain 
additional information to its equity counterpart in determining spreads? And second, why does 
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idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk contain information not already captured by equity or bond 
volatility that is relevant to the size of spread? To answer the first question, we run regressions 
for data sorted into idiosyncratic-bond-volatility deciles and show that bonds with higher 
volatilities (and larger spreads) are also those which are more sensitive to changes in the level of 
liquidity.  This suggests that bond volatility is a proxy for liquidity risk, with an impact large 
enough to generate a difference of 20 basis points in spreads between the top and bottom bond-
volatility deciles.   
 
We then address the second question, which concerns the information content of the 
idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk measure.  Equity volatility and bond volatility are both proxies 
for the volatility of the risk-neutral distribution of firm value, whereas idiosyncratic bond value-
at-risk captures not just the volatility of firm value but also its left-skewness.  We would 
therefore like to know if the firm-value distribution is indeed left-skewed (in the risk-neutral 
domain), as that would be consistent with the importance of idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk to 
spreads. We test this conjecture in the following way. We take the estimated sensitivities of 
spreads to equity volatility for different levels of leverage (using deciles from our sample) and 
then use them to fit a structural model of the Merton type at each leverage level. (This approach 
to calibration circumvents the need to estimate firm volatility and does not appear to have been 
used before.)  We demonstrate that the result from the data is an implied risk-neutral distribution 
for a representative firm which has a very fat left-hand tail. This is consistent with our hypothesis 
that idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk is able to generate realistic spreads because it takes into 
account the left-skewness of firm value in the risk-neutral domain.   
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While the paper was being finalized, the sub-prime crisis arrived and bond spreads increased 
hugely.  We have therefore extended our original 1998-2004 sample to the period 2005-2009.  
This genuine out-of-sample test allows us to verify that bond volatility and bond value-at-risk 
remain important in determining spreads, both over the extremely quiet period of 2005-2006 and 
over the extremely turbulent period of 2007-2009.  
 
The main contributions of our paper may be summarized as follows.  First, we demonstrate that 
systematic risk has very little direct effect on the level of spreads, so the pricing of bonds cannot 
easily be related to the factors affecting the pricing of equities.  Second, we show that 
idiosyncratic equity volatility has a larger impact on spreads, although not nearly as large as that 
found by Campbell and Taksler (2003).  Third, we demonstrate that idiosyncratic bond volatility 
matters for spreads over and above the effect of idiosyncratic equity volatility, one reason being 
that it is a proxy for liquidity risk.  Fourth, we find that idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk is the 
measure that generates the largest individual spreads, which is because it captures the long left-
hand tail of the risk-neutral distribution of firm value.  Fifth, we show that bond volatility and 
bond value-at-risk continue to be important determinants of spreads in the quiet period before the 
sub-prime crisis and in the turbulent period thereafter. 
 
Our paper is related to several different strands in the existing literature.  With respect to 
systematic risks, there has been surprisingly little work on whether conventional asset pricing 
models can explain either bond returns or bond spreads (notable exceptions being Fama and 
French (1993), Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer and Swaminathan (2004), and Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and 
Mann (2001)) and we try to fill this gap.  Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) examine 
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what determines changes in spreads rather than their size and conclude that there is a large 
unexplained component which is common across all bonds.  Consistent with our paper, an 
implication of their research is that very little of the spread can be explained by the probability of 
default or by systematic factors. 
 
Some researchers have investigated the extent to which liquidity could be the ‘missing factor’, 
but they are unable to explain more than about 20 basis points of the spread on investment-grade 
bonds (Ericsson and Renault, 2006; Perraudin and Taylor, 2004; Longstaff, Mithal and Neis, 
2005; Chen, Lesmond and Wei, 2007; Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen, 2008a).  Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) have argued that attention in asset pricing should be directed not only at the 
liquidity level but also at liquidity risk.  Using the extended CAPM model of Acharya and 
Pedersen, Bongaerts, de Jong and Driessen, (2008b) suggest that more than half (about 60 basis 
points) of the spread on AA-rated bonds may be due to liquidity risk but Acharya, Amihud and 
Bharath (2008) find smaller values.  This is not conclusive evidence because in these two studies 
liquidity is measured indirectly from treasury bonds and equities. A recent paper by Dick-
Nielsen, Feldhuetter and Lando (2009) uses several different measures for liquidity level, 
together with the volatility of those measures as proxies for liquidity risk, to examine their 
potential contributions to spreads.  They conclude that in normal times, such as before the sub-
prime crisis (Q4/2004 to Q1/2007), liquidity level and risk could only account for 2-5 basis 
points of spread for investment-grade bonds, but that after the crisis in 2007, liquidity level and 
risk could account for a huge 64-116 basis points of spread. 
 
The empirical paper which is closest to ours is by Campbell and Taksler (2003), who 
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demonstrate that there is a strong positive relationship between idiosyncratic equity volatility and 
bond spreads.  However, the spread/volatility relationship which they find is extraordinarily 
large, leading them to reject its consistency with structural models of the spread.  Our view is 
that the structural approach to spreads is likely to be the correct one, even if the ‘perfect’ model 
remains unknown.  This view is supported by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008), who show that 
even a very simple Merton model is good for hedging of corporate bonds.  Cremers, Driessen 
and Maenhout (2008) also show that contingent claims models can work.  They construct a 
structural model with jumps that, when suitably calibrated, is capable of generating large credit 
spreads due to the presence of downside jump-risk premia.  These downside jump-risk premia 
come through in our work in the form of the left-skewness in the risk-neutral distribution of firm 
value that we imply with our Merton-model calibration. 1  
 
Our paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we describe the data, the risk variables and the 
control variables.  Section 3 gives the results from testing systematic factors as generators of 
spreads.  Section 4 analyzes the role of idiosyncratic risks in determining spreads and reveals 
empirically the importance of bond volatility and bond value-at-risk.  Section 5 examines more 
precisely why bond volatility and bond value-at-risk are so important for the level of spreads.  
Section 6 extends the analysis to an out-of-sample period, 2005-2009.  Finally, section 7 draws 
together the conclusions and implications of our study. 
 
                                                 
1
 Two other factors that affect spreads according to recent papers are information uncertainty/asymmetry (Lu, Chen and Liao, 
2010; Guentay and Hackbarth, 2010) and time-varying market sentiment (Tang and Yan, 2010). 
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2. Data, risk variables and control variables 
2.1. Sample details 
The initial sample is based on the universe of US investment-grade corporate bonds contained 
within the Merrill Lynch Corporate Master index.  We use data from Bloomberg at a weekly 
frequency over the 417-week period, January 1997 to November 2004.  Bonds that are callable, 
puttable, or have features relating to conversion, sinking funds or step coupons are eliminated.  
We match the bond data with equity returns from the CRSP database.  After removing outliers in 
the risk measures (based on three standard deviations) and data errors in the control variables, we 
are left with 125,837 usable bond-week observations.   
 
We have chosen not to use a sample based on actual bond trades, such as the TRACE dataset, for 
two reasons.  First, the TRACE dataset only became available for the full set of US corporate 
bonds from October 2004, limiting the useable length of time series.  Second, our bond risk 
measures are calculated using weekly bond returns over a one-year window and a trade-based 
data set has gaps in return series for individual bonds, making it difficult to calculate those risk-
measures.  Using the Bloomberg data allows us to overcome this problem, as we have a 
continuous series with prices for each existing bond in each week.   
 
Table I, Panel A, gives details of the bonds in the sample, classified by rating and by year.  The 
numbers given in the table are for bonds which are “alive” at the beginning of each stated year.  
Whenever bonds reach maturity or new bonds are issued, the sample is adjusted and so there is 
no survivorship bias.  The table shows that approximately 12% of the bonds have a rating of AA 
or AAA, 55% are A-rated and 33% are BBB-rated.  Table I, Panel B, lists average spreads, by 
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rating and by year.  The numbers presented are annual time-series averages based on weekly 
cross-sections.  Median spreads over the seven years range from 72 basis points for AAA bonds 
to 146 basis points for BBB bonds. 
 
Figure 1 plots average spreads by rating over the sample period of 1997-2004.  Lower grade 
bonds have consistently larger spreads, as would be expected, but all spreads tend to move 
together, rising from early 1997 to 2002 and then falling over the next two years.  Four particular 
events lead to spikes in credit spreads during our sample period, as indicated in the figure:  the 
LTCM crisis of 8/1998; the dot.com bubble on NASDAQ during 2000; the terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Center of 9/2001; and the WorldCom default of 6/2002. 
 
2.2. Measures of bond risk 
In this section we explain the general methodology and the measures of risk to be used in 
relating credit spreads to risk factors.  In the first stage of our analysis we estimate the sensitivity 
of individual bond returns to risk factors in time series and in the second stage we then test 
whether the estimated factor-sensitivities can explain bond spreads using a panel approach.  This 
is the familiar methodology of Fama and Macbeth (1973), except that in the second stage we use 
spreads as the dependent variable − which reflect promised future bond returns −  rather than 
using actual, ex-post, bond returns. 
 
Systematic risk is usually estimated for a given security by regressing its return in time-series on 
the return of a suitably chosen index.  However a complicating factor in applying this to 
corporate bonds is that changes in the risk-free term structure may affect individual bonds 
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differently from the way in which they affect the bond index.  To remove the influence of 
changes in the risk-free term-structure, we calculate the duration of the index in each period and 
then calculate the return on a risk-free duration-matched portfolio of Treasury Bonds.  We then 
subtract the duration-matched risk-free return from the return on the index in each week.  The 
resulting series is an index of returns on the credit spread (designed specifically for the Merrill 
Lynch Corporate Master Index) and we call this the Return on the Systematic Credit Risk factor 
(RSCR).2  To take account of the impact of changes in the riskless term structure on the returns 
of individual bonds, we deduct the appropriate risk-free return rfit from each bond’s return based 
on its duration.  To estimate the simple beta for each bond, our first systematic risk measure, we 
estimate the following equation using 52 weeks of data: 
 
RBit – rfit = ait + βit RSCRt + eit   (1).   
 
As the bond beta captures the systematic risk of a bond, we measure the idiosyncratic volatility 
of the bond with the standard deviation of the residuals from equation (1).    
 
To estimate whether size or value risks explain credit spreads, we extend equation (1) to include 
the familiar SIZE and HML factors (taken from Ken French’s website), leading to the 
specification: 
  
RBit – rfit = ait + βit RSCRt + sitSIZEt +hitHMLt +  eit   (2). 
 
                                                 
2
 The risk is systematic, because it is that which remains in a well-diversified portfolio of bonds. 
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Equations (1) and (2) consider the excess return on the bond index to be the “market” risk, but it 
might be argued that the excess return on the equity market is just as relevant.  We therefore also 
estimate equation (2) replacing RSCRt with the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted index 
over three-month treasury bills, which gives us loadings on the three Fama/French factors for the 
case where the market factor is an equity index instead of a bond index.  Elton, Gruber, Agrawal 
and Mann (2001) provide support for the role of these Fama/French equity-related factors in 
explaining credit spreads. 
 
To test whether systematic higher-moment risk explains credit spreads we estimate systematic 
coskewness risk using the approach of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Harvey and Siddique 
(2000).  Applying this to bond-index risk we have,  
 
RBit – rfit = ait + βit RSCRt + γit RSCRt 2 +  eit      (3), 
 
where the systematic coskewness risk for bond i in week t is measured by γit.   
 
Another potential measure of systematic risk is downside beta.  Following Ang, Chen and Xing 
(2006), the downside beta of a security may be measured by estimating its sensitivity to the 
market return when the market is in a “down” state.  We define “downside weeks” as those in 
which the gap widens between Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield and the constant-
maturity ten-year US government bond yield.  These are weeks when credit conditions are 
worsening.  We therefore measure downside and upside betas by partitioning the previous year's 
weekly observations into downside and upside weeks based on the above criteria and estimating 
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equation (1).3 
 
Investors may be more concerned with extreme downside returns, rather than with the simple 
downside returns which can be estimated with downside betas. We therefore also consider the 
systematic “tail risk” present in bond returns.  To do this we estimate the total bond value-at-risk 
(with smoothing) and then partition it into components for systematic bond value-at-risk  and 
idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk. We use the two largest percentage negative returns for a given 
bond during the previous 52 weeks, so the confidence level is 2/52 or 3.85%.  The exact 
procedure is explained in the Appendix.4  The larger and more negative is systematic bond value-
at-risk, the more exposed is a bond to systematic tail risk and the larger the expected credit 
spread.   
 
Table II presents the different systematic and idiosyncratic risk measures for our 1998-2004 
bond sample, with averages for each rating in the left half of the table and values for the bottom, 
median and top deciles in the right half of the table.  For some risk measures the anticipated 
relationship between risk and ratings can be seen, i.e. as bond rating declines the risk measure 
increases.  However this tends not to happen as we move from AAA to AA ratings.5  For AA, A 
and BBB ratings, bond betas (however they are measured) tend to increase as ratings decline.  
Systematic bond value-at-risk and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk also rise as ratings decline, as 
do idiosyncratic bond volatility and equity volatility.  On the other hand, the size (SMB) and 
                                                 
3
 Our downside betas are estimated using rolling annual windows. The minimum number of downside weeks within our 52-week 
windows ranges from 17 to 33, with a median of 24. 
4
 The results are not materially affected by using smoothed value-at-risk rather than simple value-at-risk. The reason for 
smoothing the estimate is to avoid spurious jumps in value-at-risk when a large negative return in the period 52 weeks before the 
current week then drops out of the sample in the next week.  
5
 The peculiarity of AAA bonds has also been noted by other researchers, including Elton et al (2001), Campbell and Taksler 
(2003) and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2007). 
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value (HML) risk factors do not show a clear pattern of variation across ratings. 
 
Turning to the decile values in the right-hand part of the table, the range in risk measures 
between the bottom and top deciles is much wider than the range across ratings in the left-hand 
part of the table.  For example, the bottom and top decile bond-index betas are -0.128 and +1.502 
respectively, whereas the range across ratings in the left part of the table is only from 0.440 to 
0.664.  Similarly, the range over deciles for idiosyncratic equity volatility is from 19.2% to 
44.7%, but the range over ratings is only from 27.5% to 33.6%.  Averages of risk-measures for 
bonds within particular ratings are therefore bunched closely together and disguise the wider 
range of values which occur within each rating.   An analysis which concentrates on bonds 
averaged by rating therefore overlooks a large part of the cross-sectional variation, as we shall 
see more precisely later. 
 
2.3. Control variables 
Apart from risk measures, several control variables are included in our regressions.  These are 
split into common control variables that are the same for all bonds at each point in time and 
bond-specific control variables.  The three common control variables are the level of the term 
structure (measured as the 5-year constant-maturity Treasury yield), the slope of the term 
structure (the gap between the 20-year and three-month constant-maturity Treasury yields), and 
the spread in yields between 30-day Eurodollar deposits and US Treasury bills.  Consistent with 
structural models, the level of the term structure coefficient is expected to be negative.  The slope 
of the term structure proxies for expectations about future interest rates (e.g. Campbell and 
Taksler, 2003; Collin-Dufresne et al, 2001) and is expected to have a negative coefficient.  The 
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Eurodollar/Treasury difference in yields (TED), used by Campbell and Taksler (2003), is 
intended to capture the flight-to-quality that occurs when there is a financial crisis which 
manifests itself through the Eurodollar yield rising relative to the Treasury yield.  It is expected 
to have a positive coefficient.  
 
There are nine bond-specific control variables in the panel regressions: the reciprocal of the face 
value of the issue, the coupon rate, the time to maturity, five rating-related dummies and a 
dummy for financial companies.  The reciprocal of the face value of the bond issue is used as a 
proxy for the level of liquidity and so is expected to have a positive coefficient.  (The reciprocal 
is used, as it allows for a non-linear effect).   The coupon rate affects the amount of tax to be paid 
or the attitudes of investors to payouts and is expected to have a positive coefficient.  The time to 
maturity takes into account the shape of the term structure of credit spreads.  The coefficient that 
we obtain on time to maturity in our panel regressions will depend on the mix of bonds in our 
sample, as high grade bonds will typically have a positive relationship between spread and 
maturity (as their ratings can only fall) while low-grade bonds are expected to have a negative 
relationship between spread and maturity (as their ratings can either rise or the bonds disappear 
from the sample).  Turning to the five rating-related dummies, the first two of these correct for 
any change in rating between the time-series estimation of past risks and the current cross-
section estimation of risk impacts.  Dummy Higher (expected to be negative) takes a value of one 
in a given week’s cross-section if a bond’s rating one year ago was higher than its rating in the 
current week.  Dummy Lower (expected to be positive) takes a value of one in a given cross-
section if a bond’s rating one year ago was lower than in the current cross-section.  There is a 
need to control in cross-section for differences in expected losses due to default and we do this 
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by including dummy variables for each of the three S&P ratings relative to AAA.   Finally, we 
include a dummy variable for whether a bond is issued by a financial or by a non-financial 
company, as these firms may face different risks. 
 
3. Results on systematic risks and bond spreads 
In this section we examine how well the different systematic risk measures, estimated in the first 
stage in time-series up to the relevant week, explain current credit spreads in cross-section.  We 
use pooled panel regressions and the dependent variable is the spread of each bond in each week 
of the sample period.  We report robust t-values based on standard errors adjusted for clustering 
by issuer. 6  
 
On the left-hand side of Table III we give the estimated coefficients from the regressions and on 
the right-hand side of the table we give the contributions of the factors to the size of spread, i.e. 
their economic significance.  We estimate the contribution of a variable by multiplying its 
coefficient by the range of that variable between its median and its smallest observed value in the 
sample or zero, whichever is the larger.  For example, the median coupon in the sample is 7.125 
and the minimum observed coupon 1.950, so the relevant coupon range is 7.125 – 1.950 = 5.075 
and this is then multiplied by the estimated coefficient from the regression to give its 
contribution.  Note that it would be a mistake to attribute to coupon the full 7.125 times the 
estimated regression coefficient, because the observed range of coupons does not extend to zero. 
We can be confident that the minimum value in the sample is a valid observation, as we have 
already removed outliers.  
                                                 
6
 We have also estimated our panel regressions with issuer and time fixed effects but these have little impact and hence we report 
our results without these fixed effects.  
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Beginning with the coefficients on the left-hand side of Table III, all five of the regressions 
explain about 31% of the variance.  Regression 1 is the Fama/French specification using the 
bond index as the market factor in the first stage.  This gives a positive and significant beta-risk 
coefficient of 11.4 and also positive and significant values for size-risk (27.8) and value-risk 
(22.6).  The coefficients on inverse of face-value, coupon and time to maturity are also positive.  
The level and slope interest-rate variables at the bottom of the table have unexpected signs 
(positive and negative, respectively) and the TED (flight-to-quality) variable also has a negative 
coefficient which is implausible – it would imply that there are smaller spreads on corporate 
bonds when there is a flight to quality.  The dummy variable for whether a company is financial 
or not, at the bottom of the table, suggests that on average such companies have about 8 basis 
points of extra spread.   
 
Moving to the attributions for regression 1, shown in the first column on the right-hand side of 
the table, they are all very small.  The Fama/French factors together contribute 5 basis points, all 
of this due to the contribution of the bond-index beta.  The inverse-of-face-value variable 
generates 6 basis points, the coupon generates 20 basis points and time-to-maturity 7 basis 
points.  So the three main control variables (i.e. those with the expected signs and which are 
statistically significant) together contribute another 33 basis points.  These contributions can be 
compared with the sample median spread of 111 basis points.   
 
Regression 2 is the Fama/French specification that uses an equity index as the market factor.  It 
has a coefficient on the equity beta of 4.5 (not significant), a size coefficient of 54.0, and other 
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coefficients which are similar to those already found for regression 1.  The attributions indicate 
that the Fama/French factors in this case generate just 1 basis points of spread, less even than for 
the bond-index regression 1.  
 
Regression 3 is the beta with co-skewness formulation.  The coefficients on beta and gamma are 
both significant and contribute 5 and 0 basis points of spread respectively.  Regression 4 uses the 
upside beta/downside beta specification.  Both of these factors have significant coefficients and 
they contribute 1 and 4 basis points to spreads, respectively, which is similar to the beta/gamma 
formulation in regression 3.  Finally, regression 5 uses the estimated “beta” on the systematic 
value-at-risk of a bond, which generates -1 basis points of spread. 7 
 
The message from Table III is that systematic risk has almost no impact on the median size of 
bond spread, even if a downside focus is included.   We also find that there may be a liquidity 
effect (proxied by the inverse of face value) of about 6 basis points, a coupon effect of about 20 
basis points, and a maturity effect of about 7 basis points.  At best, using regression 3 which is 
the beta/gamma formulation, it is possible to explain 32% of the variance, while generating only 
5 basis points of spread with risk factors and 33 basis points of spread with control factors.  We 
now turn to idiosyncratic factors, to see if they are more successful in generating plausible 
spreads. 
 
4. Results on idiosyncratic risks and bond spreads 
To obtain a general idea of magnitudes, we begin in Figure 2 by plotting spreads against 
                                                 
7
 This result is different from the positive effect of value-at-risk on equity returns found by Bali, Demirtas and Levy (2009), but 
here we are considering only the (small) systematic component of that measure.  Our results (later in the paper) on the impact of 
idiosyncratic value-at-risk for bond spreads are consistent with their findings for equity returns. 
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idiosyncratic equity volatility (Panel A) and idiosyncratic bond volatility (Panel B), using 
average values for each rating of bond in each week.  It is immediately apparent from Panel A 
that spreads are strongly related to idiosyncratic equity volatility, as argued by Campbell and 
Taksler (2003).  However, the relationship is non-linear, as would be expected from a Merton-
style structural model.  In Panel B of Figure 2, idiosyncratic bond volatility shows an even closer 
relationship to spreads than idiosyncratic equity volatility and its effect is also slightly non-
linear.  The simple correlations with spreads across the 125,837 bond weeks of the whole sample 
are +0.46 for idiosyncratic equity volatility and +0.51 for bond volatility.  This preliminary 
evidence therefore indicates that the contribution of idiosyncratic volatility to spreads is likely to 
be larger than that of any systematic factor which has been found in Table III. 
 
Table IV gives the results of panel regressions for individual bond spreads against idiosyncratic 
risks and control variables.  The idiosyncratic risks considered are idiosyncratic equity volatility, 
idiosyncratic bond volatility, and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk.  To allow for the impact of 
market volatility (as contrasted with that of an individual firm), we also include in each 
regression the volatility of the S&P500 index over the last six months.8  Another variable which 
we include, as suggested by Campbell and Taksler (2003), is the average daily S&P500 return 
over the last 180 days (in percent), as that may reflect either a change in leverage or a systematic 
movement in the risk-premium required by investors (see, for example, Barberis, Huang and 
Santos, 2001).    
 
The regressions in Table IV explain between 41% and 54% of the variance of spreads, which is 
                                                 
8
 We use an exponentially weighted moving average estimate of the volatility of the S&P500. We have also experimented with 
using the VIX index of implied volatilities, but it is not significant when the S&P500 volatility is present and so we omit it from 
the table. 
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more than in Table III, and the majority of coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level 
or better.  Regression 6, which uses idiosyncratic equity volatility, explains 48% of the variance 
of spreads and has a slope on idiosyncratic equity volatility of 2.0 and on S&P volatility of 0.8.  
Together these can generate 50 basis points of the median sample spread of 111 basis points, as 
shown in the top section of the right-hand part of the table.  A positive return on the S&P500 
over the last six months also has a clear impact in reducing spreads: the coefficient of –187 
indicates that a 10% per rise over the last 180 days would reduce spreads by 10.4 basis points 
(calculated as [10/180] x -187).  The control variables for regression 6 have signs and 
magnitudes which are generally similar to those already found in Table III, except that the 
impact of the TED variable (expected to be positive) is now close to zero.  
 
Regression 7 uses idiosyncratic bond volatility instead of idiosyncratic equity volatility.  The 
results are similar to those in regression 6, except that the proportion of the variance which is 
explained rises to 52%.  The slope coefficient on idiosyncratic bond volatility is 15.4 and on the 
S&P volatility remains significant at 0.8.  Together S&P volatility and idiosyncratic bond 
volatility generate 73 basis points of spread (see right-hand part of the table), which is 
considerably more than S&P volatility and idiosyncratic equity volatility in regression 6.  The 
control variables have signs and magnitudes which are similar to those in regression 6, with one 
exception: the coefficient on coupon is negative and not significantly different from zero, which 
makes it implausible as a tax effect (c.f. Elton et al, 2001; Qi, Liu and Wu (2010). 
 
Regression 8 uses both idiosyncratic equity volatility and idiosyncratic bond volatility as 
explanatory variables.  The result is that both volatilities have significant coefficients, with the 
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bond slope being only slightly below its value in regression 7 (13.0 versus 15.4) and the equity 
slope falling somewhat relative to its value in equation 6 (1.2 versus 2.0).  The proportion of 
variance explained rises a little to 54% and together the equity volatility, bond volatility and S&P 
volatility generate 88 basis points of spread which is 79% of the sample median spread. 
 
Regression 9 uses idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk together with S&P volatility.  The proportion 
of variance explained falls slightly to 47%, but the contribution of this new variable to the 
median spread is large, being 65 basis points.  Together with S&P volatility in this regression it 
generates 74 basis points of spread, which is 66% of the sample median spread. 
 
Regressions 6a, 7a, 8a and 9a repeat the specifications of regressions 6, 7, 8, and 9, but for 
reasons of parsimony we omit all of the control variables except two: the inverse of face-value 
(liquidity proxy) which has been shown to have a consistently positive impact in the previous 
regressions, and the dummy variable for financial companies.  In regression 6a the idiosyncratic 
equity-volatility slope rises (relative to regression 6) to 2.4 and the S&P-volatility slope rises to 
1.2.  In regression 7a the idiosyncratic bond-volatility slope is virtually unchanged (from 
regression 7) at 15.1 and the S&P-volatility slope rises to 1.6. In regression 8a both idiosyncratic 
equity volatility and bond volatility remain significant, as well as S&P volatility; the proportion 
of the variance explained remains quite high at 52%. Finally, in regression 9a both idiosyncratic 
value-at-risk and S&P volatility remain significant.  The contributions of risk variables to median 
spreads are 63 basis points for regression 6a, 79 basis points for regression 7a, 99 basis points for 
regression 8a, and also 99 basis points for regression 9a.  These are respectively 57%, 71%, 89% 
and 89% of the median spread.  In these parsimonious regressions, idiosyncratic bond value at 
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risk alone can generate 84 basis points of spread (regression 9a), whereas idiosyncratic bond 
volatility generates 65 basis points (regression 7a) and idiosyncratic equity volatility generates 
52 basis points (regression 6a).   
 
The message from Table IV is that while idiosyncratic equity volatility and idiosyncratic bond 
volatility can generate quite large spreads, idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk (which incorporates 
skewness) has the most impressive contribution of all.  In addition, there is a contribution to 
spreads of liquidity (proxied by the inverse of face value) of about 8 basis points in all of our 
regressions (equivalent to 7% of the median spread) and a similar contribution from the 
financial-company dummy.  Our results differ qualitatively from those of Campbell and Taksler 
(2003), in that we discover the extra contributions of bond volatility and bond value-at-risk.  
They also differ quantitatively from those of Campbell and Taksler, in that we find the sensitivity 
of spreads to equity volatility to be 2.0 (in regression 6) whereas they report a value of about 12.9  
This difference is puzzling, but it appears that our magnitude is consistent with those found in 
several other recent studies of this relationship. 10 
 
To summarize, in this section we have found two interesting new results.  Our first result is that 
idiosyncratic bond volatility contains information relevant for explaining the level of credit 
                                                 
9
 Campbell and Taksler (2003) Table II, Regression 4, has a coefficient on daily idiosyncratic equity volatility of 189.16, which, 
dividing by the square root of 250, is equivalent to 12.0 for annual idiosyncratic equity volatility. 
 
10
 Other studies give values for the regression slope on equity volatility when spreads are used as the dependent variable that are 
much closer to the level of our paper than Campbell and Taksler (2003).  The slope in Avramov, Jostova and Philipov (2007) is 
2.69, it is 3.28 in Benkert (2004) using CDS premia, it is 0.95 in Bharath and Shumway (2008) when included with an expected 
default-frequency variable in the regression, and in Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) it is 3.44.  One part of the explanation for 
Campbell and Taksler’s result might be that they use daily transactions data, whereas other researchers use either quotes or 
weekly data (except for Benkert, who uses daily CDS premia).  However, if we redo our analysis using bonds for weeks in which 
there is a change in the spread exceeding 5 basis points (in order to increase the probability that a transaction has occurred), the 
results are not materially affected.  We also obtain similar results if we use: (i) total volatility rather than idiosyncratic volatility; 
or (ii) pure cross-sections (averaged across week), which should not be subject to any bias from infrequent trading. 
 22
spreads, which is additional to that contained in equity volatility.  Our second result is that 
idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk contains more information relevant for the size of spread than 
either idiosyncratic equity volatility or idiosyncratic bond volatility and, together with other 
relevant variables, can generate spreads of realistic median size.   
 
5. Why do idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk help to explain 
the level of credit spreads?  
 
The analysis so far has highlighted the role in explaining spreads not only of idiosyncratic equity 
volatility, but also of idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk.  In this 
section we examine why this may be happening.  
 
5.1. The role of idiosyncratic bond volatility 
Two possible reasons for the impact of idiosyncratic bond volatility in cross-section might be: (i) 
that idiosyncratic bond volatility reflects ratings, which have residual effects on spreads; or (ii) 
that idiosyncratic bond volatility is a proxy for liquidity or liquidity risk, which commands a 
premium.  Considering the first possibility, idiosyncratic bond volatility has quite a narrow 
variation across ratings, from an average of 5.88 for AAA bonds to 6.54 for BBB bonds (see 
Table II).  If we sort the sample into deciles based on idiosyncratic bond volatility, we find that 
the range in such volatility across deciles is much wider, from 3.77 to 10.22, as shown in column 
(2) of Table V.  Therefore idiosyncratic bond volatility is not closely related to ratings, so ratings 
cannot explain why idiosyncratic bond volatility matters for spreads in cross-section.   
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Considering the second possibility, if idiosyncratic bond volatility is a measure of liquidity risk 
then we would expect to find that investors become more sensitive to liquidity as we move up 
the idiosyncratic bond-volatility deciles.  To test this hypothesis we estimate a new panel 
regression between spreads and idiosyncratic equity volatility, with the same variables as already 
used in regression 6a, but this time we use dummy variables to allow each bond-volatility decile 
to have its own coefficient on the liquidity proxy (inverse of face-value) and its own coefficient 
on idiosyncratic equity volatility11. The results by decile for the coefficients on the liquidity 
proxy are given in column 3 of Table V.  The coefficients rise almost monotonically (from 471 
to 5944) as we move up idiosyncratic-bond-volatility deciles, which implies that spreads are 
more sensitive to liquidity for bonds which have more idiosyncratic volatility.  This result could 
be caused by the size of bond issue becoming smaller (liquidity falling) as we go up the bond-
volatility deciles, but column (4) of Table V shows that this does not happen: there is no 
relationship between face value and idiosyncratic bond volatility.  So we can conclude that one 
reason why idiosyncratic bond volatility is important for spreads is as a measure of liquidity risk.  
Using the coefficients in column (3) and the mean face values in column (4), we can calculate 
the liquidity premium for each decile, which is given in column (6).  It shows that bonds in the 
lowest idiosyncratic volatility decile have a liquidity premium of (471/301=) 1.6 basis points, 
whereas bonds in the highest idiosyncratic volatility decile have a liquidity premium of 
(5944/270=) 22 basis points.  The premium on liquidity risk between the top and bottom 
idiosyncratic-bond-volatility deciles is therefore approximately 20 basis points. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 We have also excluded the financial dummy in these regressions. 
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5.2. The role of idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk 
We now turn to the question of why idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk can explain such a large 
proportion of the size of credit spreads.  Our hypothesis is that bond value-at-risk reflects the 
downside skewness (or left-tail properties) of the risk-neutral distribution of firm value.  If that 
distribution is highly skewed, then even extremely safe AAA-rated bonds could have significant 
credit spreads, which might explain the median spread of 72 basis points for AAA bonds in our 
sample.  
 
How can we show that the risk neutral distribution of firm value is left-skewed?  The intuition 
behind the method that we use is the following. A corporate bond is equivalent to a risk-free 
bond plus a short position in a put written on firm value, the latter having a strike which reflects 
the outstanding debt of the firm.  Bonds written by firms with lower leverage have put 
components with strikes way out-of-the-money and therefore have implied volatilities reflecting 
the mass of the risk-neutral distribution of firm value in its far left tail.  For example, the AAA 
bonds for non-financial companies in our sample have a median leverage of 4%, i.e. the median 
AAA put is 96% out-of-the-money.  In contrast, bonds written by firms with higher leverage 
have put components with strikes much closer to-the-money and implied volatilities reflecting 
the mass of the risk-neutral firm-value distribution much closer to the current firm value.  For 
example, the BBB bonds for non-financial companies in our sample have a median leverage of 
36%, i.e. the median BBB put is only 64% out-of-the-money. Therefore by comparing the 
implied volatilities of firms with low and high leverage we can understand the shape of the risk-
neutral distribution of firm value as we move out towards its lower tail. 
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We begin by forming leverage deciles from our sample.  The data on leverage are obtained from 
CRSP and we focus on non-financial companies, leaving a sample of 82,762 bond weeks.12  We 
then calibrate a Merton model to a representative bond within each of these ten leverage deciles, 
using median values from the sample.  Instead of imposing a particular volatility or implying the 
volatility from the observed spreads, which would be the conventional approach, we calibrate the 
model to the estimated spread/equity-volatility sensitivity for each leverage decile.   
 
To the best of our knowledge this procedure for calibration has not been used before.13  If there 
is a high degree of left-skewness in the risk-neutral distribution, then the spread/equity-volatility 
sensitivities will reveal this via the calibrated model in the form of implied volatilities which are 
large and diminishing with leverage.   To implement the Merton model we make two 
assumptions: (i) we assume that a coupon-paying bond is equivalent to a zero-coupon bond with 
the same duration and so we set the bond maturity to be equal to its duration; and (ii) we assume 
that the firm’s leverage ratio will have reverted fully to its mean (estimated over the seven-year 
sample period) by the time the bond matures, which is similar to the approach taken by Collin-
Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).14   
 
Table VI gives (by leverage decile) both the information used for calibration and the results from 
the model.  The leverage in the sample (column 2) ranges from 5.5% in decile 1 to 61.2% in 
decile 10.  The duration of the bonds does not vary much across deciles, being about 6 for all of 
them (as shown in column 3).  The sensitivity of spreads to total equity volatility, estimated from 
                                                 
12
 Leverage for financial companies is different, because the nature of their business is based on leverage. 
13
 Campbell and Taklser (2003) note that their estimated sensitivities are implausibly large for a structural model to work.  
14
 We also assume that there is a flat term structure at a rate of 5% per annum.  With respect to the pay-out rate on the firm’s 
assets, it has no effect on spreads in this particular model because the leverage ratio is assumed to be at the sample mean at bond 
maturity. 
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the panel, is given in column 4; it ranges from 2.56 to 4.11. 15  Column 5 gives the main result: 
the firm-value volatility from the Merton model for a representative firm in each leverage decile, 
derived from the sensitivity of spreads to equity volatility in column 4. 16  As can be seen, the 
implied volatilities for firm value show a steep and monotonic decline as leverage rises, from 
46.9% for firms with the lowest leverage to 16.4% for firms with the highest leverage.  
 
When these implied volatilities for firm value are plotted against leverage, as is done in the lower 
line of Figure 3, they generate a “volatility sneer” which is reminiscent of that found from 
studies of equity-index options.  If there were no left-skewness in the risk-neutral distribution of 
firm value, then these volatilities would not differ across leverage and the lower line in Figure 3 
would be horizontal.  As we move up the leverage deciles, we are valuing put options in the 
Merton model which are progressively more out-of-the money: bonds in tenth decile have a 
leverage of 61% and so their put options are only 39% out-of-the-money;  bonds in the first 
decile have a leverage of 6% and so their put options are 94% out-of-the-money.  The increasing 
slope of the volatility smile, which is found as we move from high to low leverage, indicates a 
fat left-hand tail in the risk-neutral distribution of firm value.  
 
Column 6 of Table VI gives the calculated equity volatilities that are consistent with the firm-
value volatilities in the previous column.17 These equity volatilities are also plotted against 
leverage as the upper line in Figure 3 and show that there is much less of an ‘implied sneer’ in 
                                                 
15
 The reported regression slope for the sample of bonds in a given rating is the sum of slopes for the individual equity volatility 
and for the S&P volatility, in the same way as reported for individual bonds in Table IV.  
16
 We use a numerical procedure to find the results, changing the volatility of firm value until it is consistent with the given 
sensitivity of the spread to equity volatility.  
17
 Ito’s lemma connects stock volatility (σs) and firm volatility (σv) : VSSVvs ∂∂= σσ where VS∂∂  is estimated with the model, V 
denotes firm value and S denotes equity. 
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equity volatility than there is in firm-value volatility.  That is consistent with the evidence of 
research on the smiles of options on individual equities, which do not generally show a sneer but 
show quite a wide variety of shapes (see Bakshi, Kapadia and Madan, 2003; Buraschi, Trojani 
and Vedolin, 2009).  Column 7 of Table VI gives the spreads generated by the model, which 
range from 14 basis points in the second decile to 50 basis points in the tenth decile.  Comparing 
these model spreads with the market spreads, given in column 8, we find that the model is able to 
generate about 15- 30% of observed spreads.  These modest spreads, generated by calibrating the 
model to the spread/equity-volatility sensitivity, are nevertheless much larger than those which 
are generated by using the conventional approach (in which the volatility of firm value is 
estimated from observed equity volatility), particularly for the safest bonds.  The latter approach 
generates only 2 basis points of spread for the first four leverage levels, as compared with the 
new approach which generates 14-17 basis points for the same leverages. 18 
 
We can now summarize what has been learnt from the calibration exercise with the Merton 
model from our panel data. 19   It shows that the risk-neutral distribution of firm value is left-
skewed, which increases the value of out-of-the-money put options relative to a lognormal world 
and “pumps up” the spreads on the lower-leverage AAA and AA bonds.  The observed risk-
neutral skewness is consistent with the hypothesis made at the beginning of this section, that 
idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk generates large spreads because it captures left-skewness in the 
risk-neutral domain.20 
                                                 
18
 The conventional approach is to estimate the volatility of firm value from equity volatility and then solve simultaneously for 
the firm-value volatility and firm value.   Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) give a clear discussion of this method. We omit detailed 
calculations here, for reasons of space and continuity.   
19
 We have experimented with fitting the Merton model directly to the spread/ idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk sensitivity.  This 
does not work satisfactorily because more than one solution is possible.  In this regard, it is well known that value-at-risk is not a 
coherent measure (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath, 1999). 
20
 The conclusion that there is left-skewness in the risk-neutral distribution is consistent with the structural approach of Cremers 
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6. Out-of-sample tests over 2005-2006 and 2007-2009 
 
The paper so far has used data up to the end of 2004, but the years immediately following are 
particularly interesting as 2005-2006 is a period of benign markets and low spreads, whereas 
2007-2009 is the period of the sub-prime crisis and has volatile markets and high spreads.   We 
have therefore collected a new set of data for 2005-2009 in order to test how well our different 
measures of idiosyncratic risk perform across changing bond market conditions.21  This 
constitutes a genuine out-of-sample test of our risk measures as we did not have this data to hand 
when our paper was initially written.  The new data were collected and cleaned in the same 
manner as for our initial sample and after removal of outliers we were left with 163,158 
additional bond-week observations. 
 
Figure 4 plots spreads for A-rated bonds, together with S&P500 volatility, over the whole 1998-
2009 period.22  During 2005-2006 S&P500 volatility is at the low average level of 11.8% and A-
rated spreads are also low, averaging 85 basis points.  During 2007 both volatility and spreads 
start to rise and the peak in spreads comes in December 2008, when A-rated spreads reach 642 
basis points.  Given the two distinct periods in the new sample, we re-run our idiosyncratic-risk 
regressions for both the quiet 2005-2006 period and for the extremely volatile sub-prime crisis 
period 2007-2009.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
et al (2008) and the reduced-form approaches of Berndt, Duffie, Ferguson and Schranz (2008) and Driessen (2005). 
21
 We thank the referee for suggesting this extension of our original study.  Our new sample follows on exactly from the previous 
sample and starts in December 2004. 
22
 We plot A-rated bonds, as they are the largest group in our sample, but other rating groups behave similarly. 
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Table VII gives the results of the idiosyncratic-risk regressions for the quiet period of 2005-
2006, in the format already used for the period 1998-2004 in Table IV.  The median spread in 
this period is 66 basis points.  Looking at the attributions in the right-hand part of the table, 
idiosyncratic equity volatility and S&P volatility have almost no influence on spreads in this 
period, which contrasts with our earlier finding that idiosyncratic equity volatility is important 
for 1998-2004.  How can we interpret the low contribution of these types of equity volatility to 
spreads during 2005-2006?  If we step back and consider the relationship between spreads and 
equity volatility from a structural model perspective, the relationship is non-linear and increasing 
in slope.  As a result, equity volatility will only have a telling impact on spreads if it is 
sufficiently high which was not the case during 2005-2006.   Hence it is perfectly plausible that 
the contributions of equity volatility and S&P 500 volatility during this period are close to zero.  
 
Interestingly, Table VII also shows that idiosyncratic bond volatility remains just as important 
over 2005-2006 as before, contributing up to 50 basis points of spread and that idiosyncratic 
value-at-risk can also generate 38 basis points of spread.  These contributions are quite large 
when compared with the 66 basis-point median spread in this two-year period and are 75% and 
58% of the median spread respectively.  The results for 2005-2006 therefore support 
idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk as major contributors to the 
level of spreads, even in a remarkably quiet period.   
 
The period 2007-2009 is completely different from 2005-2006, because it includes the sub-prime 
crisis, and the median spread is nearly three times as large, being 190 basis points.  The 
regression results for this period are given in Table VIII.  Once again looking at the attributions 
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in the right-hand part of the table, we see that idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk now makes the 
largest contribution to spreads of up to 111 basis points.  This may be compared with the 
contribution of up to 58 basis points for idiosyncratic bond volatility and the contribution of up 
to 57 basis points for idiosyncratic equity volatility.  At the same time, S&P 500 volatility also 
becomes much more important than it was over 1998-2004, with a contribution that reaches 65 
basis points (depending on which other variables are included in the regression).  What explains 
the greater importance of S&P 500 and idiosyncratic equity volatility during the sub-prime 
period?  Again this stems from the non-linear relationship between spreads and equity volatility 
as equity volatility will only contribute to spreads if it is sufficiently high.  This was the case 
during the sub-prime episode which explains why both types of equity volatility in 2007-2009 
make a more substantial contribution to spreads.   
 
The median spread over this period is 190 basis points, so idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk can 
generate nearly 60% of the spread while the idiosyncratic measures based on bond volatility and 
idiosyncratic equity volatility can each generate about 30% of the spread.  In addition, S&P 500 
volatility contributes up to 59% of the spread, which is a sharp contrast to its zero contribution 
over 2005-2006.   Together idiosyncratic value at risk and S&P 500 volatility can generate up to 
175 basis points of spread, which is 92% of the median.  
 
One other variable which increases its influence in 2007-2009 is whether a company is financial 
or not.  During the sub-prime period of 2007-2009 being a financial company leads to a spread 
which is on average about 80 basis points larger than that of an equivalent non-financial 
company, after all other factors have been taken into account.  This may be compared with its 
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impact over 2005-2006 of close to zero (Table VII) and of about 10 basis points over 1998-2004 
(Table IV).  
 
In conclusion, extending the sample to 2005-2006 and 2007-2009 confirms that idiosyncratic 
bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk are closely related to the size of spread on 
corporate bonds. 23  They are important not only in an extremely volatile period (2007-2009) but 
also in an extremely quiet period (2005-2006).  It appears that idiosyncratic bond volatility has a 
relatively constant impact in all periods, whereas idiosyncratic bond value at risk rises and falls 
in its relative importance for spreads as the market volatility rises and falls.  The conclusions 
from the earlier 1998-2004 period on the importance of these variables for spreads are therefore 
strongly supported by these out-of-sample tests. 
 
7. Conclusions and implications 
 
Our paper investigates why credit-spreads for investment-grade corporate bonds are so large.  
We find that over 1998-2004 systematic risk factors can explain some of the variance of spreads 
but make very little contribution to their level.   Instead we find that the level of spreads is 
related more closely to idiosyncratic risk, not only to idiosyncratic equity volatility (as in 
                                                 
23
 We have also checked that idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk remain important for 
explaining the size of spreads for the full period December 2004 to December 2009 inclusive.  Idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk 
makes the largest contribution to median bond spreads (which were approximately 100 basis points) over this period of 91 basis 
points, followed by idiosyncratic bond volatility with a contribution of 46 basis points and then by idiosyncratic equity volatility 
with a contribution of 34 basis points (all at best).  S&P volatility also contributes upto 40 basis points to spreads.  Undertaking 
our tests for the two separate periods 2005-2006 and for 2007-2009 constitutes a much more severe test of our idiosyncratic risk 
variables as we are effectively undertaking two rather than simply one out-of-sample test.  
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Campbell and Taksler, 2003), but also to idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond 
value-at-risk.  Of these risk measures, idiosyncratic bond volatility has the highest correlation 
with spreads, but idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk generates the largest spreads.  Idiosyncratic 
risks (including that of a bond and of the S&P500) can explain up to 90% of the size of spread 
and about half of its variance.  During the quiet period before the sub-prime crisis of 2005-2006, 
idiosyncratic equity volatility becomes unimportant for spreads but the bond-based risk measures 
do not.  After the sub-prime crisis over 2007-2009, all idiosyncratic risk measures become more 
important for the level of spreads, but particularly idiosyncratic value at risk. 
 
This raises the question of why idiosyncratic bond volatility and idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk 
are relevant to spreads.  We find that idiosyncratic bond volatility is not just an indicator of the 
volatility of firm value, but it also reflects liquidity risk.  After removing the effect of equity 
volatility, bonds with higher idiosyncratic volatility over 1998-2004 are more sensitive to the 
level of liquidity (as proxied by the inverse of issue size).  The differences in liquidity risk 
measured in this way across individual bonds in our sample are quite large, generating 20 basis 
points of extra spread between the top and bottom bond-volatility deciles.  By contrast, the 
differences in liquidity risk across ratings are quite small (because each rating is a mix of both 
high-liquidity and low-liquidity bonds), so using a bond’s rating as a measure of its liquidity risk 
could be misleading. 
 
We hypothesize that idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk generates large spreads because it allows 
for left-skewness of the distribution of firm value (in the risk-neutral domain).  We therefore test 
whether the firm-value distribution (in the risk-neutral domain) is indeed left-skewed.  By 
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calibrating a Merton-style structural model in a new way, using the sensitivity of spreads to 
equity volatility from our sample, we are able to show that the left tail of the firm-value 
distribution is extremely fat relative to the lognormal standard. The implication is that investors 
exhibit great aversion to extreme losses, which is consistent with the effectiveness of 
idiosyncratic bond value-at-risk in generating large spreads.  We also find that this effect falls in 
the quiet period of 2005-2006 and rises in the volatile sub-prime period of 2007-2009. 
 
Our work has several implications for future research.  First, our results support the option-based 
(structural) approach to credit spreads, but they also suggest that such models will not be very 
successful unless they take account of investors’ extreme aversion to risk on the downside.  The 
model by Leland (2006) is a move in that direction. Second, more research is needed on liquidity 
risk and bond spreads.  This work should not only report on the statistical significance of 
regression models but also on its economic significance, i.e. the model’s ability to generate 
spreads of a plausible size, as we have done.  We need to understand better the way in which 
investors perceive bond volatility as a measure of liquidity risk and why bond volatility is so 
huge (see also Bao and Pan, 2008).  The ‘credit crunch’ data from the middle of 2007 onwards 
provide an ideal sample for such analyses.  Credit-crunch research to date has concentrated more 
on potential mechanisms for liquidity-feedback loops than on the exact nature of liquidity (see 
e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009, with an exception being Dick-Nielsen et al, 2009).  Third, 
it would be interesting to see how well the forward-looking risk premium from bond spreads is 
able to predict the risk premium in the stock market.  The equity risk-premium puzzle and bond 
credit-spread puzzle seem likely to be one and the same, as argued by Chen, Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein (2006): both depend on time-varying risk-aversion and a left-skewed risk-neutral 
 34
distribution of firm value.  Some initial work along these lines, based on the similarity of the 
behaviour of equity-index options and bond credit spreads, has been completed by Gemmill and 
Yang (2009) and such a view also underlies the analysis of CDO mispricing by Coval, Jurek and 
Stafford (2009). 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
We thank Ronald Anderson, Peter Christoffersen, Keith Cuthbertson, Darrell Duffie, Joost 
Driessen, Miguel Ferreira, Ian Marsh, Kjell Nyborg, Richard Payne, Pedro Santa-Clara, David 
Stolin, Suresh Sundaresan, Alex Taylor, Lorenzo Trapani and seminar participants at Athens 
University of Business and Economics, Bologna University, Cass Business School, the European 
Winter Finance Summit at Skarsnuten in Norway, HEC Lausanne, ISCTE Lisbon, Manchester 
Business School, Toulouse Business School, University of Bristol and Warwick Business 
School.  We also thank JingFeng Ahn and Myria Kyriakou for data assistance and an anonymous 
referee for helpful suggestions.  All errors and omissions are ours. 
 
References 
Acharya, V., Pedersen, L., 2005. Asset pricing with liquidity risk. Journal of Financial 
Economics 77, 375-410. 
 
Acharya, V., Amihud,Y., Bharath, S., 2008. Liquidity risk of corporate bond returns. Working 
Paper, Stern School of Business. 
 
Amato, J., Remolona, E., 2003. The credit spread puzzle. Quarterly Review, Bank for 
International Settlements, December, 51-63. 
 
Amato, J., Remolona, E., 2005. The pricing of unexpected credit losses. Working Paper, Bank 
for International Settlements. 
 
 35
Ang, A., Chen, J., Xing, Y., 2006. Downside risk. Review of Financial Studies 194, 1191-1239. 
 
Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J., Heath, D., 1999. Coherent measures of risk. Mathematical 
Finance 9, 203-228. 
 
Avramov, D., Jostova G., Philipov A., 2007. Understanding changes in corporate credit spreads.  
Financial Analysts Journal 63, 90-105. 
 
Bakshi, G., Kapadia, N., Madan, D., 2003. Stock return characteristics, skew laws, and 
differential pricing of individual equity options. Review of Financial Studies 16, 101-143. 
 
Bali, T., Demirtas, K., Levy. H., 2009. Is there an intertemporal relation between downside risk 
and expected returns? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 883-909. 
 
Bao, J., Pan, J., 2008. Excess volatility of corporate bonds. Working paper, MIT. 
 
Barberis, N., Huang, M., Santos, T., 2001. Prospect theory and asset prices. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 116, 1-53. 
 
Benkert, C., 2004. Explaining credit default swap premia. Journal of Futures Markets 24, 71-92. 
 
Berndt, A., Douglas, R., Duffie, D., Ferguson, M., Schranz, D., 2008. Measuring default risk 
premia from default swap rates and EDFs. Working Paper, Carnegie-Mellon. 
 
Bharath, S., Shumway, T., 2008. Forecasting default with the Merton distance to default model. 
Review of Financial Studies 21, 1339-1369. 
 
Bongaerts, D., de Jong, F., Driessen, J., 2008a. Credit default swap premia and liquidity risk. 
Working paper, University of Amsterdam. 
 
Bongaerts, D., de Jong, F., Driessen, J., 2008b. Liquidity risk premia in corporate bond markets. 
Working paper, University of Amsterdam. 
 
Brunnermeier, M., Pedersen, L., 2009. Market liquidity and funding liquidity. Review of 
Financial Studies 22, 2201-2238. 
 
 36
Buraschi, A., Trojani, F., Vedolin, A., 2009, When uncertainty blows in the orchard: 
comovement and equilibrium volatility risk premia. Working paper, Imperial College, London. 
 
Campbell, J.,Taksler, G., 2003. Equity volatility and corporate bond yields. Journal of Finance 
58, 2321-2350. 
 
Chen, L., Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R., 2006. On the relation between credit spread puzzles 
and the equity premium puzzle. Review of Financial Studies 22, 3367-3409. 
 
Chen, L., Lesmond, D., Wei, J., 2007. Corporate yield spreads and bond liquidity. Journal of 
Finance 62, 119-149. 
 
Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R., 2001. Do credit spreads reflect stationary leverage ratios? 
Journal of Finance 56, 1929-1957. 
 
Collin-Dufresne, P., Goldstein, R., Martin, J., 2001. The determinants of credit spread changes.  
Journal of Finance 56, 2177-2207. 
 
Coval, J., Jurek, J., Stafford, E., 2009. Economic catastrophe bonds. American Economic 
Review 99, 628-666. 
 
Cremers, M., Driessen,J., Maenhout, P., 2008. Explaining the level of credit spreads.  Option 
implied jump-risk premia in a firm-value model. Review of Financial Studies 21, 2209-2242 
 
Dick-Nielsen, J., Feldhuetter, P., Lando, D., 2009. Corporate bond liquidity before and after the 
onset of the subprime crisis. Working Paper, Copenhagen Business School, Denmark. 
 
Driessen, J., 2005. Is default event risk priced in corporate bonds? Review of Financial Studies 
18, 165-195. 
 
Elton, E., Gruber, M., Agrawal, D., Mann, C., 2001. Explaining the rate spread on corporate 
bonds. Journal of Finance 56, 247-277. 
 
Eom, Y., Helwege, J.,Huang, J., 2004. Structural models of corporate bond pricing: An empirical 
analysis. Review of Financial Studies 17, 499-504. 
 
 37
Ericsson, J., Renault, O., 2005. Liquidity and credit risk. Journal of Finance 61, 2219-2250. 
 
Fama, E., MacBeth, J., 1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal of Political 
Economy 81, 607-636. 
 
Fama, E., French, K., 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of 
Financial Economics 33, 3-56. 
 
Gebhardt, W., Hvidkjaer, S., Swanimathan, B., 2005. The cross-section of expected corporate 
bond returns: Betas or characteristics? Journal of Financial Economics 75, 85-114. 
 
Gemmill, G., Yang, Y., 2009. The equity-smile and credit-spread puzzles: Are they one and the 
same? Working paper, Business School, University of Warwick, UK 
 
Guentay, L., Hackbarth, D., 2010. Corporate bond credit spreads and forecast dispersion. Journal 
of Banking and Finance 34, 2328-2345. 
 
Harvey, C., Siddique, A., 2000. Conditional skewness in asset-pricing tests. Journal of Finance 
55, 1263-1295. 
 
Huang, J., Huang, M., 2003.  How much of the corporate-treasury yield spread is due to credit 
risk? Working Paper, Stanford. 
 
Kraus, A., Litzenberger, R., 1976. Skewness preference and the value of risk assets. Journal of 
Finance 31, 1085-1100. 
 
Leland, H., 2006. A new structural model, Bendheim Lectures in Finance, Lecture 2. Princeton 
University. 
 
Longstaff, F., Mithal, S.,Neis, E., 2005. Corporate yield spreads: Default risk or liquidity? 
Journal of Finance 60, 2213-2253. 
 
Lu, C., Chen, C., Liao,H., 2010. Information uncertainty, information asymmetry and corporate 
bond yield spreads. Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 2265-2279. 
 
Merton, R., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. Journal of 
 38
Finance 29, 449-470. 
 
Perraudin, W., Taylor, A., 2003. Liquidity and bond market spreads. Working Paper, Bank of 
England. 
 
Qi, H., Liu, S., Wu, C.,  2010. Structural models of corporate bond pricing with personal taxes. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 34, 1700-1718. 
 
Schaefer, S., Strebulaev, I., 2008.  Structural models of credit risk are useful: Evidence from 
hedge ratios on corporate bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 90, 1–19. 
 
Tang, D., Yan, H., 2010. Market conditions, default risk and credit spreads. Journal of Banking 
and Finance 34, 743-753. 
  
Appendix: Estimating weekly bond value-at-risk 
 
In this appendix we describe how we estimate our smoothed bond value-at-risk measures. The procedure we use 
involves estimating value-at-risk using data from the last 52 weeks, based on the two weeks for which weighted 
returns are lowest. We take bond returns over the last 52 weeks and weight them more heavily if they are recent.  
We weight each return as: 
 
RWt =  Rt-k [(52-k)/52]λ ,  
 
where RW is weighted return, R is unweighted return, k is an index of weeks (in the range 0 to 52), t denotes current 
week and λ is a parameter (for which we choose the value 0.1).  
 
Let the largest negative weighted return over 52 weeks be RWt1.  This is used as one estimate of value-at-risk.  To 
split this value-at-risk into systematic and idiosyncratic components, we use the remaining 51 weeks of data to run 
equation (1).  We then find the systematic component by using the estimated beta from equation (1), together with 
the values of the other independent variables in the value-at-risk week.  The residual is the idiosyncratic value-at-
risk. 
 
We repeat this process with the 51 weeks of weighted returns, excluding RWt1, and find the week with the second-
highest value-at-risk, RWt2.  This is then split into its systematic and idiosyncratic components, as was done with 
RWt1. 
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Finally, we average the two systematic values-at-risk and the two idiosyncratic values-at-risk, to give the final 
smoothed estimates of systematic value-at-risk and idiosyncratic value-at-risk. 
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Table I: Details of the 1998-2004 Bond Sample 
 
This table presents details of our sample. The numbers of bonds in Panel A are for bonds which are “alive” at the 
beginning of each stated year in each rating category. Average spreads by rating in Panel B are calculated as annual 
time series averages based on weekly cross-sections. Mean and median bond market value, coupon rate, time to 
maturity, duration and leverage across bond-weeks by rating are presented in Panel C. Leverage is measured for 
non-financial companies only. 
 
Panel A: Number of Bonds in Sample, by Rating Year 
  
Rating 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean Proportion
AAA 15 15 18 15 13 19 19 16 3.5%
AA 48 57 53 47 48 41 32 47 9.9%
A 230 266 270 260 233 250 253 252 53.4%
BBB 134 153 167 164 156 147 178 157 33.3%
All bonds 427 491 508 486 450 457 482 472 100.0%
Across years
 
Panel B: Average Bond Spreads by Rating Year (basis points) 
 
Rating 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean Median
AAA 57.4 73.4 106.0 94.2 85.0 62.3 53.2 74.3 72.0
AA 68.8 76.1 115.6 101.3 87.3 64.8 50.7 83.4 77.0
A 91.7 104.8 153.4 144.3 121.7 84.4 67.3 109.7 103.0
BBB 126.1 153.3 207.3 204.5 195.2 144.9 114.1 163.8 146.0
All bonds 97.5 115.9 165.1 157.1 139.7 100.7 81.8 122.9 111.0
Across years
 
 
 Panel C: Characteristics of Bond Sample by Rating 
Characteristic
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
313.2 300 319 250 281.7 250 291.8 250
6.9 6.8 7.0 6.8 7.2 7.1 7.4 7.3
15.2 10.4 10.2 7.0 10.5 7.2 10.5 7.2
8.4 7.6 6.4 5.6 6.4 5.7 6.3 5.7
Leverage (%) 11.9 4.3 15.5 12.0 27.8 23.4 37.7 36.6
Face value ($m)
Coupon rate (%)
Maturity (years)
Duration (years)
AAA AA A BBB
 
Table II: Bond Risk Measures for 1998-2004 Averaged by Rating and by Decile 
This table gives average values, for ratings and for top, bottom and middle deciles of the risk measures used in the two-stage asset-pricing tests.  Beta (bond 
index) is estimated by regressing  bond returns in excess of a matched risk-free bond return on the systematic credit risk factor while the beta (equity index) is 
estimated  by regressing the same excess bond return on the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted index.  FF denotes the Fama/French three-factor model.  
SMB is the coefficient on the Fama/French size factor.  HML is coefficient on the Fama/French value factor.  Gamma is the coefficient on the systematic credit 
risk factor squared and measures co-skewness.  Beta upside and beta downside are betas estimated using a bond index for data separated into up and down 
periods. Value-at-risk is measured as described in the main text and the Appendix.  
 
Risk Measure AAA AA A BBB Bottom Decile Median Top Decile
Beta (bond index) 0.440 0.413 0.575 0.664 -0.128 0.461 1.502
Beta (FF, bond index) 0.424 0.403 0.563 0.651 -0.163 0.450 1.500
SMB (FF, bond index) 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.008 -0.097 0.007 0.124
HML (FF, bond index) 0.017 0.016 0.010 0.004 -0.114 0.004 0.132
Beta (FF, equity index) 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.011 -0.083 0.007 0.100
SMB (FF, equity index) 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.026 -0.100 0.019 0.164
HML (FF, equity index) 0.018 0.024 0.021 0.017 -0.133 0.015 0.181
Beta (co-skewness) 0.260 0.307 0.488 0.576 -0.310 0.374 1.478
Gamma (co-skewness) -12.790 -4.010 -5.220 -2.770 -120.190 -2.680 120.052
Beta downside (bond index) 0.599 0.490 0.664 0.724 -0.217 0.512 1.864
Beta upside (bond index) 0.640 0.494 0.658 0.786 -0.721 0.479 2.358
Systematic value-at-risk (decimal, weekly) 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0020 0.0002 0.0016
Idiosyncratic value-at-risk (decimal, weekly) -0.0318 -0.0323 -0.0328 -0.0359 -0.0414 -0.0332 -0.0272
Idiosyncratic bond volatility (percent, annual) 5.88 5.64 5.81 6.54 4.27 5.49 8.61
Idiosyncratic equity volatility (percent, annual) 27.53 31.54 30.96 33.57 19.16 31.03 44.71
Total equity volatility (percent, annual) 28.39 31.66 33.04 34.22 19.95 32.80 46.90
Bond weeks in the sample 4159 12356 69821 39501
Individual bonds in the sample 28 113 478 334
Individual firms in the sample 16 45 165 167
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Table III: Panel Regressions of Spreads on Systematic Risk Factors and Control Variables over 1998 to 2004 
This table gives results from regressions of individual spreads on estimated risk-factor exposures and control variables.  The coefficients on the factors and their 
associated t-statistics (in italics), calculated using robust standard errors allowing for clustering by issuer are given in the left-hand part of the table. The 
contributions of the factors to median spreads are given in the right-hand part of the table.  Contributions are calculated as the coefficient times the range for a 
factor between its median and it minimum level (or zero, whichever is greater).  
issuer
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Beta equity 4.5 0.29 0
Size equity 54.0 4.41 1
Value equity 24.5 2.66 0
Beta bond 11.4 5.29 5
Size bond 27.8 1.99 0
Value bond 22.6 2.23 0
Beta bond with gamma 12.8 5.94 5
Gamma bond 0.03 3.64 0
Beta bond upside 2.7 2.41 1
Beta bond downside 8.1 6.79 4
Systematic VaR -2560.6 -5.04 -1
Constant (AAA) 39.2 3.5 38.9 3.5 40.6 3.5 41.5 3.6 39.5 3.5
Dummy AA 10.3 1.8 10.2 1.8 10.1 1.8 11.0 2.0 10.0 1.9
Dummy A 31.8 8.0 33.2 8.7 31.2 7.7 32.2 8.2 32.7 8.9
Dummy BBB 86.0 14.1 88.8 14.9 84.8 13.8 86.3 14.2 87.4 14.9
1/Face value 1912 2.0 2105 2.2 1956 2.0 1909 2.0 1949 2.0 6 6 6 6 6
Coupon 3.9 2.7 3.9 2.7 3.9 2.8 4.1 2.9 4.2 2.9 20 20 20 21 22
Time to maturity 1.1 5.8 1.3 7.4 1.1 5.6 1.0 5.4 1.3 7.4 7 8 7 6 8
Dummy higher -6.8 -1.4 -7.4 -1.6 -7.1 -1.5 -7.2 -1.5 -6.9 -1.4
Dummy lower 28.7 5.4 28.9 5.5 28.3 5.4 28.8 5.5 29.0 5.5
Int.rate level 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 0.9 1.0
Int.rate slope -8.8 -11.0 -10.1 -11.7 -8.7 -11.3 -8.9 -10.9 -9.2 -11.4
TED (libor - tbills) -18.9 -6.7 -12.7 -4.6 -20.8 -7.5 -19.3 -6.9 -18.9 -6.6
Fin Company Dummy 8.4 2.1 9.6 2.4 8.1 2.0 8.5 2.1 9.0 2.2
N 125837 125837 125837 125837 125837
R-squared 0.313 0.314 0.316 0.315 0.311
Coefficients and t-statistics clustered by Contributions to Median Spreads (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Table IV: Panel Regressions Relating Spreads to Idiosyncratic Factors and Control Variables over 1998 to 2004 
 
This table presents the results of regressions of individual spreads on idiosyncratic factors and control variables.  The coefficients on the factors and their 
associated t-statistics (in italics), calculated using robust standard errors allowing for clustering by issuer are given in the left-hand part of the table. The 
contributions of the factors to median spreads are given in the right-hand part of the table.  Contributions are calculated as the coefficient times the range for a 
factor between its median and it minimum level (or zero, whichever is greater).  
Equation (6) (7) (8) (9) (6a) (7a) (8a) (9a)
Equity volatility 2.0 9.62 1.2 6.98 2.4 13.49 1.7 10.28 42 27 52 37
S&P volatility 0.8 5.86 0.8 6.18 0.6 4.67 1.0 7.87 1.2 9.18 1.6 12.58 0.9 7.32 1.6 13.83 7 7 5 9 11 14 8 15
Bond volatility 15.4 11.31 13.0 9.30 15.1 16.45 12.6 13.42 66 56 65 54
Idiosync. VAR -2466.8 -9.50 -3186.7 -13.71 65 84
50 73 88 74 63 79 99 99
S&P return -186.5 -11.59 -217.5 -17.90 -183.6 -12.96 -228.7 -17.40 -134.6 -7.53 -153.3 -10.81 -138.6 -8.81 -160.3 -10.41
Constant (AAA) -61.0 -5.13 -31.2 -3.00 -53.9 -5.28 -44.8 -3.88 -25.4 -3.12 -54.4 -8.38 -76.0 -10.60 -63.5 -7.82
Dummy AA 3.7 0.81 3.6 1.02 1.7 0.49 6.1 1.41 -3.5 -0.61 9.9 2.61 3.6 0.99 3.2 0.71
Dummy A 27.7 6.39 28.4 9.98 25.4 7.99 31.1 8.88 23.9 4.28 32.6 9.52 26.5 7.35 28.1 9.35
Dummy BBB 79.3 12.89 73.6 16.03 69.9 14.57 81.3 15.36 73.2 9.92 78.6 14.72 70.7 13.15 74.5 13.63
1/face value 3035.7 3.02 2304.9 2.85 2614.5 3.17 2116.1 2.33 3480.6 3.19 3111.3 3.76 3116.5 3.63 2460.0 2.49 9 7 8 6 10 9 9 7
Coupon 3.9 2.71 -1.3 -1.05 -0.3 -0.20 -2.7 -1.74
Time to maturity 1.5 7.81 -0.5 -2.28 -0.2 -0.90 1.1 6.70
Dummy higher -8.0 -2.42 -4.9 -1.61 -6.2 -2.14 -4.8 -1.57 59 80 96 81 73 88 108 106
Dummy lower 21.3 4.64 16.8 4.60 14.6 3.94 22.9 5.64
Int.rate level 2.4 2.07 5.4 5.69 2.3 2.21 6.2 6.37
Int.rate slope -2.2 -2.54 -5.6 -7.21 -3.7 -4.68 -4.0 -4.80
TED (libor - tbills) -0.4 -0.17 -1.3 -0.66 1.4 0.65 -3.5 -1.60
Fin Comp Dummy 13.4 3.20 7.6 2.35 10.3 3.03 8.6 2.40 4.7 1.03 8.4 2.52 10.8 2.98 2.2 0.60
N 125837 125837 125837 125837 125837 125837 125837 125837
R-squared 0.478 0.519 0.538 0.470 0.418 0.475 0.523 0.410
(6a) (7a) (8a) (9a)
Coefficients and t-statistics clustered by issuer Contributions to Median Spreads (bps)
(6) (7) (8) (9)
 
   
 
Table V:  Idiosyncratic Bond-Volatility Deciles and Estimated Liquidity Premia 
 
This table gives information on bond-volatility deciles.  The mean bond volatility in column 2 for each 
decile is in percent per annum.  The coefficient on 1/ face-value of issue (column 3) is estimated with a 
panel regression of bond spreads on: ratings, equity volatility, S&P volatility, S&P return and 1/ face-value 
by decile.    The liquidity premia in column 5 are the result of dividing the numbers in column 3 by those in 
column 4 and rounding to the nearest basis point 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Idiosyncratic 
Bond 
Volatility 
Decile
Mean 
Idiosyncratic 
Bond 
Volatility 
Coefficient 
on 1/Face-
Value
Mean Face-
Value of 
Bond Issue 
$m
Liquidity 
Premium in 
basis points
1 3.77 471 301 2
2 4.46 998 290 3
3 4.76 1740 287 6
4 5.03 2053 296 7
5 5.33 3330 286 12
6 5.68 4202 278 15
7 6.17 4867 303 16
8 6.90 4927 295 17
9 7.93 6042 287 21
10 10.22 5944 270 22
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Table VI: Results from Calibrating a Merton-style Model to the Spread/Equity-Volatility 
Sensitivities for Leverage Deciles 
 
This table presents the results of calibrating a Merton-style structural model for each leverage decile to the 
estimated sensitivity of the spread to equity volatility for that leverage decile.  Median values for leverage 
are used in this exercise, as we wish to generate representative implied volatilities for each decile.  Only 
non-financial companies are included, as leverage measures for financial companies can be misleading.   
 
 
Regression Implied Implied Model Median
Leverage Median Median Slope on Equity Firm-Value Equity Spread Market
Decile Leverage Duration Volatility Volatility (%) Volatility (%) (bp) Spread (bp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 0.055 6.11 2.57 46.9 49.6 14.8 75
2 0.110 6.51 2.62 37.1 41.6 14.1 79
3 0.152 6.38 2.88 33.7 39.7 15.8 97
4 0.198 5.66 3.04 31.8 39.5 17.3 105
5 0.250 6.58 2.91 26.5 35.2 15.9 115
6 0.299 5.95 2.98 24.9 35.3 16.7 129
7 0.355 6.96 3.30 21.8 33.6 20.3 137
8 0.416 6.00 3.20 20.3 34.5 20.8 129
9 0.480 6.23 3.29 18.0 34.2 23.2 148
10 0.612 6.26 4.11 16.4 40.9 49.9 155
 
 
  
Table VII: Panel Regressions Relating Spreads to Idiosyncratic Factors and Control Variables for 2005-2006 
 
This table gives results from regressions of individual spreads on estimated risk-factor exposures and control variables.  The coefficients on the factors and their 
associated t-statistics (in italics), calculated using robust standard errors allowing for clustering by issuer are given in the left-hand part of the table. The 
contributions of the factors to median spreads are given in the right-hand part of the table.  Contributions are calculated as the coefficient times the range for a 
factor between its median and it minimum level (or zero, whichever is greater). 
Equation (10) (11) (12) (13) (10a) (11a) (12a) (13a)
Equity volatility 0.1 5.12 0.1 5.15 0.0 1.16 0.1 2.53 1 1 0 0
S&P volatility -0.2 -1.31 -0.1 -0.96 -0.1 -0.91 -0.1 -1.13 -0.4 -2.21 -0.3 -3.43 -0.3 -3.39 -0.3 -2.30 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1
Bond volatility 17.7 42.69 17.7 42.74 18.9 117.91 18.9 117.93 47 47 50 50
Idiosync. VAR -809.5 -14.03 -1727.1 -86.46 18 38
0 47 48 17 -1 49 50 37
S&P return -52.6 -5.34 -50.5 -5.80 -49.7 -5.71 -53.4 -5.55 -62.3 -4.65 -73.6 -8.14 -73.1 -8.07 -64.5 -5.58
Constant (AAA) 33.6 9.58 14.4 4.83 13.1 4.35 31.6 9.56 65.1 34.27 -7.0 -5.51 -7.9 -6.12 21.5 13.70
Dummy AA 6.7 18.64 5.8 17.32 5.6 16.68 6.5 18.24 6.5 15.04 6.3 18.54 6.2 18.14 6.3 17.21
Dummy A 14.6 39.41 13.7 40.00 13.5 38.32 14.3 40.17 16.3 35.02 12.6 37.94 12.4 37.13 13.6 34.70
Dummy BBB 45.3 58.97 39.9 59.37 39.5 60.40 44.9 57.98 50.2 53.59 36.5 50.20 36.2 52.14 44.2 49.87
1/face value -772.6 -10.44 -972.2 -15.17 -965.8 -15.23 -777.9 -10.50 858.4 8.56 -1192.1 -17.35 -1188.4 -17.40 -112.8 -1.27 -3 -4 -4 -3 3 -5 -5 0
Coupon 3.4 52.06 -4.9 -25.31 -4.9 -25.36 0.6 2.86
Time to maturity 2.3 61.70 1.5 40.80 1.5 40.79 2.4 59.94
Dummy higher -5.1 -9.36 -4.0 -8.18 -4.2 -8.47 -5.0 -9.23 -3 43 44 15 2 45 45 37
Dummy lower 15.1 16.37 12.9 15.83 12.8 15.45 15.4 16.87
Int.rate level -2.8 -3.99 -1.7 -2.91 -1.7 -2.90 -3.2 -4.62
Int.rate slope -2.3 -3.54 -3.2 -5.82 -3.2 -5.65 -1.6 -2.44
TED (libor - tbills) 9.9 4.03 12.0 5.14 11.9 5.20 9.6 3.86
Fin Company Dum 1.7 4.17 0.9 2.54 1.1 2.97 1.0 2.67 -10.4 -15.60 -0.6 -1.47 -0.5 -1.12 -6.7 13.70
N 70509 70509 70509 70509 70509 70509 70509 70509
R-squared 0.610 0.663 0.664 0.613 0.281 0.547 0.548 0.352
(10) (11) (12) (13)
Coefficients and t-statistics clustered by issuer Contributions to Median Spreads (bps)
(10a) (11a) (12a) (13a)
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Table VIII: Panel Regressions Relating Spreads to Idiosyncratic Factors and Control Variables for 2007-2009 
 
This table gives results from regressions of individual spreads on estimated risk-factor exposures and control variables.  The coefficients on the factors and their 
associated t-statistics (in italics), calculated using robust standard errors allowing for clustering by issuer are given in the left-hand part of the table. The 
contributions of the factors to median spreads are given in the right-hand part of the table.  Contributions are calculated as the coefficient times the range for a 
factor between its median and it minimum level (or zero, whichever is greater). 
Equation (14) (15) (16) (17) (14a) (15a) (16a) (17a)
Equity volatility 1.5 4.13 1.0 3.10 2.5 7.19 1.4 4.55 34 23 57 32
S&P volatility 2.8 5.88 1.7 5.97 1.2 3.41 2.1 7.05 4.5 6.38 3.9 15.28 3.0 7.55 4.8 17.27 38 23 17 28 61 53 41 65
Bond volatility 14.0 9.73 12.9 9.12 15.6 16.19 12.5 10.23 52 48 58 46
Idiosync. VAR -3073.0 -8.23 -3633.0 -11.39 94 111
72 75 88 121 118 111 119 175
S&P return -384.1 -13.29 -477.0 -14.19 -477.6 -14.33 -429.0 -13.56 -331.3 -8.10 -443.7 -13.63 -470.1 -14.08 -351.6 -10.32
Constant (AAA) 19.3 0.77 43.5 2.06 30.9 1.43 28.5 1.32 -105.8 -6.51 -109.0 -8.59 -104.7 12.54 -149.0 -10.03
Dummy AA -7.1 -0.99 9.9 1.38 -0.9 -0.12 16.3 2.35 -4.3 -0.60 17.5 3.19 0.6 0.09 27.4 4.90
Dummy A 56.4 6.12 65.0 7.97 50.5 7.01 75.6 8.27 63.9 5.40 77.2 9.76 54.2 6.91 92.5 9.69
Dummy BBB 168.8 11.49 152.4 12.33 139.3 11.02 164.9 12.46 183.9 12.27 165.1 12.77 145.7 11.69 180.4 12.65
1/face value 11842.0 4.41 7008.0 2.95 9824.0 4.49 4612.0 1.89 10987.0 3.55 2720.0 1.14 8162.0 3.57 -1146.0 -0.45 19 11 16 8 18 4 13 -2
Coupon 3.4 1.61 -1.9 -0.83 -1.5 -0.70 -4.5 -1.97
Time to maturity 0.0 0.04 -2.0 -2.41 -1.9 -2.25 -1.2 -2.23
Dummy higher 4.9 0.91 -10.4 -2.37 -5.8 -0.97 -8.6 -2.08 92 86 104 129 136 115 132 174
Dummy lower 65.0 5.88 55.8 4.38 44.0 4.14 54.5 4.26
Int.rate level -29.5 -6.91 -24.6 -6.99 -22.7 -5.58 -27.0 -7.91
Int.rate slope 6.9 2.84 -0.5 -0.22 -6.0 -2.22 8.1 4.45
TED (libor - tbills) 2.3 4.42 18.7 4.46 23.9 4.92 11.2 2.96
Fin Company Dum. 87.8 8.73 74.2 9.94 66.1 8.21 73.9 9.63 85.5 7.60 93.5 10.66 80.7 9.99 90.2 10.99
N 92649 92649 92649 92649 92649 92649 92649 92649
R-squared 0.602 0.642 0.65 0.651 0.572 0.615 0.635 0.614
(14a) (15a) (16a) (17a)(14) (15) (16) (17)
Coefficients and t-statistics clustered by issuer Contributions to Median Spreads (bps)
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Figure 1: Average Credit Spreads by Rating and S&P500 Level over the 1998-2004 Period 
The data in this figure are weekly and relate to the period from 7th January 1998 to 29th December 2004.  The credit spreads are in basis points and relate to the 
left-hand axis.   The S&P500 level relates to the right-hand axis. 
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Figure 2: Credit Spreads and Idiosyncratic Volatilities, averaged by week and rating, for 1998 to 2004 
Each point in a graph is the result of averaging across all bonds in a particular rating category in a particular week.  There are 365 weeks in the sample.  The y-
axis is the credit spread in basis points.  The x-axis in Panel A is idiosyncratic equity volatility and the x-axis in Panel B is idiosyncratic bond volatility. 
 
 
Panel A: Equity Idiosyncratic Volatilities and Spreads by Rating 
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Panel B: Bond Idiosyncratic Volatilities and Spreads by Rating 
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Figure 3: Implied Volatility and Leverage (for leverage deciles) from Merton Model 
This graph gives implied volatilities for firm-value (lower line) and equity (upper line) against leverage for each of the leverage deciles.  The values for the plots 
are given in Table VI.  
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Figure 4: A-Bond Spreads and S&P500 Volatility over 1998-2009 
This graph gives the average spread in each week for the bonds in the sample which are A-rated, together with the S&P500 volatility at that time.  The volatility 
is measured as an exponentially-weighted moving average over the last 180 days. 
 
 
